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Abstract 
As in numerous big cities in developing countries, environmental problems in Cotonou are 
becoming more and more severe. These problems are the result, among other factors, of the 
strong air pollution by the motorbike transport sector.  
This study, while considering health expenditures due to air pollution, uses a general equilibrium 
model and an optimal model of taxation to derive the optimal level of the taxation that should be 
applied to the motorbike taxi. On the basis of simulations achieved from the derivative tax, the 
study shows that an instrument of control based on the polluter pay principle will help to reduce 
the emission of carbon monoxyde (CO).   
Key world : Pollution – motorbike Taxi – Polluter Pay Principle – General Equilibrium Model – 
Optimal Tax  
JEL Code : Q52, Q53, H21, D51 
 
Introduction 
 
As with many others developing African major cities, environmental problems in Cotonou are 
more and more noticeable. These problems are the result, among other things, of air pollution 
caused to a large extent by the transportation sector.  
According to the World Bank ( WB 2002), Benin’s energy schedule shows that the transport 
sector is a high-energy consumer. It represents 62 percent of the country’s oil expenses, four 
times more than the industrial sector. Moreover it has to be noted that transport mainly has a 
very local impact on air quality, in the absence of a reliable public transport system, air pollution 
has worsened because of an increasing number of old second hand cars (more than 240.000) and 
taxi-motorbikes (approxi. 80.000)  (Fanou et al 2006). Gasoline is also of poor quality, due to 
illegal import of sub-standard products from neighboring Nigeria. This justifies why atmospheric 
pollution along Cotonou’s major highways is almost all caused by transport. This was confirmed 
from results of various analyses: CO concentration level outside of the city was 10 times less than 
at the main intersections. (WB, 2002; Fanou et al, 2006) 
Air pollution is associated with an increased risk of many adverse health effects; e.g. mortality, 
respiratory diseases and cancer (Fanou et al, 2006). The impact of air pollution on an individual’s 
health from a vehicle’s exhaust is determined by the increase in a large range of illnesses from 
respiratory and lead related illnesses to allergies and skin illnesses. A specific analysis of hospital 
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data (survey carried out by the WB and Clean Air Initiative in Sub-Saharan African Cities in 2002) 
clearly indicates that air pollution in Cotonou is responsible for the high frequency of severe 
respiratory infections. Also, as concentrations of lead in the air are much higher than the norm 
(CO concentration reached 18mg/Nm3, almost double the norm), one can deduce that a certain 
number of neurological symptoms are developed mainly in children. 
 According to the WB (2002), emissions will double on average in 2010. The genotoxic 
compounds present in ambient air by the year 2010 will reach 8 times more than the norm in 
certain places and suspended particles from SO will become noticeable. 
Given the evolution in the pollution level obtained from these calculations, the situation will 
obviously worsen and become unacceptable before 2010. It is therefore most important to take 
appropriate measures immediately to limit, as much as possible, the pollution of air quality in 
Cotonou.  
The ABE (Agence Beninoise de l’Environnement) Benin Agency for Environment made a set of 
proposal for the purpose to reduce the air pollution in Cotonou: pollution stricter regulations for 
the quality of vehicles for sale in Cotonou, replacing 2 cycle motorbikes by 4 cycle motorbikes 
that pollute less especially in HC emission, modification of 2 cycle engines to reduce emissions, 
improvement of 2-cycle oil quality and of gas/oil mixtures, establishment of technical controls 
for 2-wheelers improvement in the carburant sector and establishment of trained mechanics. But 
face to the practical difficulties to apply those solutions, a tax based on the polluter pays principle 
is instituted in 2004 in the framework of the State budget in application of de framework law on 
environment (DSRP du Benin, 2005 or Poverty alleviation Program). This solution even more 
realistic has many problems with regards to it conception (this explains why since 2004 this tax 
has not been applied yet), in fact, unlike the other tax, pollution tax should be considered 
primarily for their environmental effects, not for their revenue potential. The purpose of my 
study is to propose an analytical framework toward the use of emission taxes in Cotonou (Benin).     
1. Environmental management policies 
 
There are five guiding principles for incorporating environmental concerns in to decision making. 
These principles can be used to design environmental instruments and to raise funds to finance 
environmental public investments plans in the sectoral and overall budget. They are, Polluter 
pays principle (PPP), user pays principle (UPP) (or resource pricing principle), precautionary 
principle (PP), subsidiary principle (SP), intergenerational equity principle (IEP)2. In the 
framework of this work we will emphasize the polluter pays principle  
1.1 Polluter pays principle (PPP) 
The Polluter Pays Principle was first widely discussed in the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro of Brazil in June 1992. This principle was 
endorsed by all the attending representatives of the countries.  
The PPP required that the polluter has to bear the cost of complying with environmental 
standards, which are predetermined by public authorities. If the polluters have to pay for the cost 
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of any pollution they cause, market forces will then encourage them to change their activities 
either by introducing new pollution control technologies or by switching to more efficient 
production process. In its original emergence the Polluter Pays Principle aims at determining how 
the costs of pollution prevention and control must be allocated: the polluter must pay. Its 
immediate goal is that of internalizing the environmental externalities of economic activities, so 
that the prices of goods and services fully reflect the costs of production.  There are two 
objectives with PPP towards encouraging to more efficient production process, they are:  
i. To promote economic efficiency in the implementation of pollution control policies.  
ii. To minimize potential trade distortions arising from environmental policies.  
Bugge (1996))  
PPP was partly based on equity considerations (the polluter should pay the cost of any mitigation 
measures), and partly ensure that countries do not provide competitive advantage for their 
producers by subsidizing the pollution abatement measures.  
One more important point is that PPP is not necessary to achieve an efficient solution to an 
environmental problem and it does not require pollution to recede to zero levels, nor does it 
require reduction to optimal level even though it is not excluded. PP required only that the 
environment is in an acceptable state, which will evolve from a political process requiring inputs 
from local, national and international level. 
The normative scope of the PPP has evolved over time to include also accidental pollution 
prevention, control and clean-up costs, in what is referred to as extended Polluter Pays Principle.  
Today the Principle is a generally recognized principle of International Environmental Law, and 
it is a fundamental principle of environmental policy of both the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the European Community. 
2. Polluter pays principle theoretical considerations 
In order to present the most fundamental result in tax as a pollution control, we shall initially 
assume that efficiency - is the way to achieve a given target with the lowest cost- is the sole 
criterion used in deciding policy choice. Baumol and Oates (1971) showed that an efficient 
outcome could be achieved by setting a tax on emissions at the level where the Marginal 
Abatement Cost equals the Marginal Abatement Benefit. To state the theorem as Baumol and 
Oates put it: ‘A tax rate set at  level that achieves the desired reduction in the total emission of 
pollutant emission will satisfy the necessary conditions for the minimization of the program cost 
to the society’(Hanley et al,1997). 
Formal proof of the efficiency properties of the a tax on emission have been provided by Baumol 
and Oates (1988) and by Fisher (1980). Based on an earlier model of Fisher (1980), Hanley et al 
(1997) showed that, by using a centralized model that the tax must be equal to the shadow price 
of pollution reduction in the problem of the social planner. This also implies that for a given tax 
level, the marginal abatement cost across all firms must be equal under the cost-minimizing 
solution. The discussion generally assumes uniformly mixed pollutant (the source and the spatial 
repartition don’t matter). 
4 
 
Seekin et al (1983) examine the cost of meeting a target improvement in ambient levels of 
nitrogen dioxide (NO2 ) in Chicago; given that NO2 in a non-uniformly mixed pollutant, they 
verified that, the tax based instrument as stated by Fisher (1980) cannot achieve the least cost 
solution. We can then conclude that the assumption of uniformly mixed pollutant is important 
for the efficiency of the tax scheme. 
Michaelis (1992), considers the problem of the multiples pollutants3 from the point of view to 
how to design a tax system. The important question here is the level of efficient relative tax rates 
for the four main greenhouse gases (GHGs). He shows that the relative tax rate between two 
pollutants depend on their relative damage and dispersion coefficients.  Michaelis shows that 
absolute tax rates depend on the initial stock of GHGs, the time period over which the model is 
run, the level of abatement costs and the initial period level of emission. 
Pollution taxes have long been advocated by the environmental economists as an efficient means 
of controlling pollution. It was accepted by all governments of the OECD in 1972 and later in 
1995 laid down in the Treaty of Rome. In February 2004, European Union governments and 
lawmakers reached agreement on this new legislation that will force industries guilty of polluting 
the environment to pay for the clean-up. The Agreement on New Directive on Environmental 
Liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage will help to 
establish a common framework for applying the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP), one of the key 
environmental principles enshrined in the EU Treaty, to prevent environmental damage (caused 
or threatened by a range of occupational activities which present a risk to human health or the 
environment, or the manufacture, use, storage or transport of substances, products or goods 
which are already subject to regulation under relevant EU industrial, chemical and environmental 
legislation); and biodiversity damage (i.e. damage to protected habitats and species as defined 
under the Birds and Habitats Directive, or as provided for by National legislation) caused or 
threatened by any other occupational activities whenever the operator has been at fault or 
negligent. At the international level the Kyoto Protocol is an example of application of the PPP: 
parties that have obligations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions must bear the costs of 
reducing (prevention and control) such polluting emissions.  
From the above discussion it becomes clear that tax based instrument can lead to efficient 
control of pollution. However we cannot use directly the analytical framework of Fisher to design 
tax based environment control instrument especially in air pollution area since the pollutant is not 
uniformly mixed in Cotonou. Ideally we should seek for a model that takes into account that 
factor. Our work here sets all the assumptions of Fisher but relaxes the source assumption by 
considering different pollution sources (however our work will focus only on taxis-motor sector)  
3. Toward the use of emission taxes in Cotonou: Methodological approach 
3.1 Theoretical model 
 
We use a two steps method that consists of: 
                                                        
3 He take the 4 pollutants that causes the so-called ‘greenhouse-gases’: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(NO2), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFC11 and CFC12) 
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-First, A general equilibrium model based on an earlier model of Fisher (1980), however the 
model is modified to take account of the data availability and to meet the real case of Cotonou. 
The objective here is to derive how the taxation/compensation must be designed.  
-Secondly we use an optimal taxation model to derive the level of tax that should be charged to 
the taxi-motor men. 
3.1.1 Taxation/compensation design model 
Assumptions 
§ Let’s assume n goods, m populations of Cotonou and h “motor-taxi”, z other firms. 
§ We assume that the motor-taxis are the causer of a part of the pollutant emitting in 
Cotonou, which is clearly identifiable. 
§ We assume also that the ambient concentration in air pollutant across Cotonou is the 
same at any point. 
§ The utility function and the production function are well behaved.  
§ We index the production function d=1 if it is a taxi-motor production function and d=0 if 
it is the other firm production function. 
 
The problem of the social planner (or the government) is: 
                                               (1) 
s.t   
 
                
 
                            
  
     
  
  this function contains the 
smoke variable 
Tik = is the amount of services or resources i produced or consumed 
S1h = Smoke emitted by taxi-motor man h 
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 z 
Xn= Health good depending on the smoke externality 
 
§ Equation (1) is the objective function; it is consumer 1 utility function and 
contains a smoke externality S 
§ (2) Says the utility of each consumer other than the one whose utility is being 
maximized must be at least equal to some level Uj* 
§ (3) Is a set of production motor-taxi-men production function 
§ (4)  Is a set of other firms production function 
§ (5) is the resource/commodity constraint 
 
 
 
 
The lagrangian gives: 
 
The first order conditions give: 
Differentiate with respect to  gives: 
 
Differentiate with respect to  gives: 
 
Differentiate with respect to smoke of the taxi-moto gives 
        (8) 
Differentiate with respect to the smoke of the others firm gives: 
                  (9) 
§ We assign to each consumer and firm (non polluter firm and motor taxi) tax or 
compensation depending on the smoke damaged suffered or smoke damage caused. Let  
tj  and t1k and  t0k  represent the tax/compensation for the consumer and the motor-taxi 
and the other firms respectively. 
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§ The program of the consumers (any individual in Cotonou) becomes: 
 Before derive the consumer program let’s write it budget constraint: 
§ Assuming that the consumer consumes of the n goods so that n1+1 to n 
services or goods are sold. 
His expenditure is =  
And his income is =  
The budget constraint becomes:  
                                                 So                                (10) 
We can then write the program as: 
 
 
The first order conditions give4 
 
 
 
§ The Producer program is: 
The problem for them is to maximize profit subject to the production constraint 
ü The motor-taxi 
 
The first order conditions give 
Differentiate with respect to  and  give 
 
                                                        
4 Differentiate with respect to  
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ü The other firms 
 
 
Differentiate with respect to  and  give: 
The first order conditions give 
 
 
 
 
For the set of equations from (6) to (17) to be the same5 we need to have: 
 
 
 
 
 
§ (i) ) Says that the sum of the tax that should be charged to the motor taxi and the 
others firms, must be equal to the marginal health degradation caused at the optimal level 
of emission. 
§ (ii) Implies the victims (any individual living in Cotonou) should not be taxed, 
but neither should he be paid any compensation –based on the amount equivalent to the 
damage they suffer. 
From now our concern consist of deriving the marginal health degradation caused at the 
optimal level of emission. 
3.1.2 Model of optimal taxation 
                
The basic theory of optimal environmental taxation was worked out by Agnar Sandmo in an 
article in the Swedish Journal of Economics in 1975. Some points that have emerged from 
Sandmo’s work are the following: 
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There is an “optimal” level of taxation on commodities, including those which generate 
pollution. The optimal level of taxation is determined by the government’s overall revenue needs, 
the market characteristics of each commodity, and the externalities generated by the commodity. 
The basic Sandmo’s formula is: 
Optimal Tax (%) = (1-a) ´ [Revenue Portion] + a ´ [Marginal Damages]    (18) 
There are 2 parts to the tax, the “Revenue Portion” and “Marginal Damages.” The first portion is 
determined strictly by the need to raise revenue, and the second is determined strictly by 
environmental considerations. The two parts should be considered separately. 
Each part is weighted by a parameter “a”. 
“a” is the inverse of the “Marginal Cost of Public Funds.” 
The marginal cost of public funds is the amount of economic activity lost when the government 
increases its tax take from the economy by $1. It is usually assumed to be about 1.25—1.40, 
based on empirical works done in the 1980’s. This means that the economy loses about $1.25 in 
economic activity for every $1 additional revenue taken by the government. 
Thus “a” would equal 1/1.25 = 0.8 
As the government’s total revenue requirement goes up, the marginal cost of public funds rises 
and therefore a falls. Thus, the heavier the economic burden of the general tax system, the less the rationale for 
green taxes. Also, the less the overall burden of the tax system, the greater the rationale for green taxes. 
“Marginal Damages” represents the total amount that people who are fully-informed about the 
effects of the pollution would be willing to pay to reduce emissions by one unit, if they had the 
option to go into a market and buy such emission reductions. If a particular pollutant is hardly 
noticeable or has little effect, people won’t be willing to pay to avoid exposure to it. If a pollutant 
is quite irritating or hazardous people might collectively be willing to give up a great deal of their 
economic welfare to reduce exposure. The “economic” approach to pollution control recognizes 
that markets which would allow people to express their preference for cleaner air, water etc. are 
very incomplete. Green taxes should simulate the prices that would emerge in a proper 
competitive market. 
3.2 Data and sources 
 
Our data come from the Ministry of environment data file, the World  
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Health Organization6 data file and from the WB survey7. Here is the summarizing of our data. 
Taxi motor number 80.000 
Total Emission CO (TE) (Carbon Monoxide)8 83 tonnes/day 
Contribution of Taxi Motor (CTM) in the overall pollution 49 tonnes/day 
Average distance driving by a Taxi Motor per day  125km 
Health care (D) expenditure due to the        pollution 20 billions 
FCFA 
 
3.3 Derivation of the taxation level 
Our model is based on Sandmos’s model; we modified his model to adapt it to the availability of 
data and to meet the own reality of Cotonou. To deal with the availability of the data problem, 
let’s assume that the health degradation due to the emission is equivalent to the health care 
expenditure due to the pollution. This is conforming to the willingness to accept theory. 
Assume that the damage cost due to pollution in Cotonou is equal to the expenditure in Health 
care. According to the World Bank study in 20029 the cost of respiratory ailments was analytically 
evaluated at approx. 20 billion CFA per year.  
We must derive the marginal damage of pollution in Cotonou 
Let D=20 billion 
The overall damage per day is Cd 
  
CTM in percentage is equal to [49/83]*100 = 53.03% 
According to the PPP and the general equilibrium model we derived, the taxi moto will 
charge 53,03% 
Let mdt be this charge 
mdt=[55555556*53.03]/100 
       =29461111 FCFA 
mdt is equal to the marginal damage of pollution due to all the taxis-motor of Cotonou 
Assuming that all the Taxi motor are identical, the marginal damage per taxi motor will  be: 
Mdk= mdt/80.000 
        =368 FCFA 
Assuming that this marginal damage occurs after 125km (Average distance driving by a taxi-
motor per day) the marginal damage per km is 
Md= Mdk/125 
    = 3FCFA/km 
Md is equal to the tax that should be charged to the taxi-motor per km, according to the 
                                                        
6 Country press Releases WHO/AFRO March 2003 
7 http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings 
8 there are also others emission for example, H2, NOx, SO2 we are concern here about the most represented CO 
9 http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings 
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model we derived; this tax is equal to the marginal health damage caused per km. 
Using Sandmo’s model and the marginal cost of public funds (presented in the 
methodological approach), the emitting tax must be: 
mdc= 0.8*3 
mdc= 2.4 FCFA 
mdc represent for Cotonou the marginal damage chargeable per km. 
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3.4 Simulations: 
Let’s assume this model to make some simulations to see the behavior of the tax system 
Tax= E*D* mdc 
Where D is the total distance driven since the last control10 
              E is the emission class from 0 to 3, with 0 being the cleanest and 3 being the 
dirtiest per km11 
Assuming that the taxi-motor X belongs to class 3 and has driven 10.000 km, his fees will 
equal to 
feex= 1.5*10.000*2.4 
       = 36.000 FCFA 
Suppose taxi-moto Y has driven the same amount, but has rated E= ½ his fees or tax will 
be: 
feey= ½ *10.000*2.4 
        = 12.000 FCFA 
Knowing they will face these kind of fee, they have an incentive to drive less, get they motorbike 
turned up to a lower emissions class, or get a cleaner type of motorbike if they have to drive that 
much. 
4. Effects of that Policy and Conclusion 
 
The incentives created by such a pricing scheme would be: 
§ Those who drive a lot will tend to buy low emission motorbike 
§ High-emission motorbike would be allocated through the used motorbike market in the 
hands of people who either live in low-damage areas (i.e. rural and remote area that don’t 
have air quality problems) or who drive very little. 
§ Mechanics would find growing demand from motorbike owners on maintenance options 
to keep vehicles in a lower emissions class. 
§ Regardless of the motorbike emission class, all motorbike owners would have a 
continuous incentive to economize on distance traveled. This may translate into increased 
ridership on public transit, and elimination of the most frivolous motorbike trips. 
 
To be efficient this scheme of tax should be apply to all vehicle in Cotonou, to do so, this study 
should include the motorbike that are not Taxi moto, and all the vehicle. Once apply this tax 
scheme will help to develop public or common transport and hence achieve the goal of reduction 
                                                        
10 Another work can interest in the optimal number of control per year. 
11 These measures here are completely ad-hoc and can be done by the ABE with his specialized garages SOBEPAT, 
WCM-BENIN, Auto star and Mutuelle confiance (in DSRP- 2005) 
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of the pollution. In a wide study, one should include the heterogeneity in the damage through 
Cotonou.  
Such a pricing scheme would have to be coordinated among the Ministry of finance, Ministry of 
transport, ABE, and the commune of Cotonou. These services should create program that would 
automatically generate the information needed to assess this policy effectiveness. 
One weakness of this work was to suppose one pollutant (CO) this choice was based on the 
availability of the data. In a number of important cases of pollution problems, an undesirable 
environmental effect is brought about by a number of pollutants, which jointly produce the 
effect. In Cotonou except CO there is also pollution due to H2, NOx, SO2. Michaelis (1992) 
suggest considering the problem in the framework of multiple pollutants taxes. 
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